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The reality is that in order to maintain an effective drone campaign, the U.S. must also have a force presence in the region. Intelligence access drives an effective drone campaign. The U.S. needs good intelligence to target terrorists and to limit collateral damage. If the U.S. withdraws combat forces from Afghanistan too quickly (i.e., before the recent gains against the Taliban are solidified and the Afghan army sufficiently trained and equipped), it will lose overall leverage in the region as well as the ability to conduct effective drone strikes.
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Special operations are most effective when launched with the backbone of support-providing conventional forces. The U.S. Navy's presence was essential in Somalia, the Air Force's support in the first phase of Afghanistan, and the Army's muscle during the surge in Iraq. Special forces without robust conventional forces is like a wide receiver without a quarterback and a line. It's a return to Desert One.
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COMMENT: Drones need conventional force presence. Special operations need conventional force presence. So withdrawing from the world and relying on such covert and not-so-overt measures, as Paultards imply their guru will, is not do the job. The funny part is, if Ron Paul is elected, it won't be ZOG that is discredited when the plans fail and the covert operations are discovered (and they will be, unless he orders the silencing of critics--quite the libertarian, huh). It'll be Ron Paul and a ZOG-free America that is discredited.
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Most Paultards honestly don't realize this! In most cases, when one puts this to them, they follow their instincts to be happy about an American defeat and failure in such situations, failing to think through and realize it's THEIR GUY and THEIR REGIME which will be in power. So they go "YAY!" when they first hear how badly their idea will go, and only later realize how self-destructive their disingenuous politics has been. It's simple cognitive dissonance, on a par with that of Teabrainers. And yes, Paultards deserve that insult.
